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Carbon pricing is a recurrent theme in debates on climate policy. Discarded at the
2009 COP in Copenhagen, it remained part of deliberations for a climate agreement in
subsequent years. As there is still much misunderstanding about the many reasons to
implement a global carbon price, ideological resistance against it prospers. Here, we
present the main arguments for carbon pricing, to stimulate a fair and well-informed
discussion about it. These include considerations that have received little attention so
far. We stress that a main reason to use carbon pricing is environmental effectiveness
at a relatively low cost, which in turn contributes to enhance social and political accept-
ability of climate policy. This includes the property that corrected prices stimulate
rapid environmental innovations. These arguments are underappreciated in the public
debate, where pricing is frequently downplayed and the erroneous view that innova-
tion policies are sufﬁcient is widespread. Carbon pricing and technology policies are,
though, largely complementary and thus are both needed for effective climate policy.
We also comment on the complementarity of other instruments to carbon pricing. We
further discuss distributional consequences of carbon pricing and present suggestions
on how to address these. Other political economy issues that receive attention are
lobbying, co-beneﬁts, international policy coordination, motivational crowding
in/out, and long-term commitment. The overview ends with reﬂections on imple-
menting a global carbon price, whether through a carbon tax or emissions trading.
The discussion goes beyond traditional arguments from environmental economics
by including relevant insights from energy research and innovation studies
as well. © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of COP21 in Paris, countries willhave to turn pledges into effective policies, to guar-
antee that their promises about reduction of green-
house gas (GHG) emissions are actually achieved. It
is easy to underestimate this challenge. We will argue
that to achieve the Paris targets, the use of the instru-
ment of carbon pricing is essential, even though not
sufﬁcient. All alternative options are likely to lead to
inadequate and overly costly abatement activities.
Imprudent policy design could have extremely far
reaching consequences, not least because of the real
chance of dangerous climate change.
However, many observers are critical of car-
bon pricing, often without being well informed
about its unique advantages. Research suggests that
resistance to innovative environmental policy—
whether by citizens, ﬁrms, NGOs, or politicians—
may be driven by lack of knowledge about how it
exactly functions and which impacts it generates.1
Ex post, that is, based on experience with imple-
mented new policies, perceptions may dramatically
change so that social–political acceptability
increases.2,3 Hence, imperfect information is an
important obstacle to the implementation of carbon
pricing, particularly as it allows political-ideological
motivations to dominate.
Here, we argue that the main reason for car-
bon pricing is to achieve environmental goals at a
reasonable cost, relatively low to that of other
instruments. We provide many reasons for this,
going beyond traditional static arguments about
cost-effectiveness from environmental economics,
by including relevant insights from energy research
and innovation studies. Admittedly, many main-
stream economic accounts of carbon or environ-
mental pricing provide a more limited and
technical perspective that often is not very accessi-
ble to noneconomists. Our paper offers a broader
treatment that includes additional considerations,
reﬂects a more heterodox and critical perspective
on carbon pricing, and adopts a more multidiscipli-
nary angle. We further brieﬂy address some core
political economy issues associated with carbon
pricing, that is, reasons for why widespread imple-
mentation of such an instrument is not observed in
reality.4 This involves attention for distributional
equity, lobbying, co-beneﬁts, international coordi-
nation of policy, and motivational crowding in/out.
While most arguments we consider have received
ample attention in the literature, a comprehensive
and synthetic treatment is missing. By summarizing
all main arguments in favor of carbon pricing, this
paper therefore ﬁlls a gap. It offers an accessible
and nontechnical synopsis of the need for carbon
pricing in a post-Paris world. This hopefully contri-
butes to the debate on carbon pricing improving in
quality and having more impact on political
decision-making.
GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE
CHARACTERISTICS FOR POLICY
INSTRUMENTS
Climate change possesses several characteristics that
must be accounted for in the formulation of climate
policies to guarantee their effectiveness. Sources of
anthropogenic GHG emissions are diverse and cover
all economic sectors. Emissions arise principally from
the combustion of fossil fuels, in very distinct activ-
ities, including resource extraction, production, con-
sumption, transport, and waste management
activities. This explains the heterogeneity of the many
abatement options and associated costs. The GHG
emissions accumulate in the atmosphere with resi-
dence times stretching from decades to millennia.
Therefore, abatement incentives should last through
time and be dynamic, that is, responsive to economic
and technological change. The location of GHG
emissions does not affect climate change as GHGs
mix uniformly in the atmosphere. Hence, a reduction
of emissions has the same global effect independently
of the distribution of abatement efforts across space.
Mitigating climate change lacks a simple end-of-pipe
solution. Even though carbon capture and storage
technologies may be part of the solution, these apply
especially to large point sources and thus cannot pro-
vide an overall answer. Indeed, combating climate
change represents such an immense and immediate
challenge that relying on the promise of one option
would be very risky. Instead, many options are
required, including altering the composition of
demand (using less energy), structural change in the
composition of the economy (dirty vs cleaner sectors
and products, and different input mixes in produc-
tion), low-carbon transport, more energy-efﬁcient
technologies, and low-carbon (notably renewable)
energy sources. Finally, particularly challenging for
international negotiations is that abatement activities
are generally costly and contribute to a global public
good, meaning that others can beneﬁt from them
without undertaking any effort. This motivates the
need to coordinate actions by countries and polluters
to avoid free riding and international carbon leakage.
Worldwide consistent policies are required to ensure
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cost-effectiveness of total abatement, fair economic
competition between countries, and limited trans-
boundary displacement of emissions.
We will argue that carbon pricing supported by
a climate agreement is able to respond to these char-
acteristics of climate change. This becomes clear by
considering seven unique advantages of it, as
explained in the next section.
SEVEN ARGUMENTS FOR GLOBAL
CARBON PRICING
Carbon pricing affects emissions by penalizing energy
sources in proportion to their carbon content. It is
easily applicable to emissions coming from energy
use, but can be extended to emissions arising from
land use changes and other sources. In what follows
we present the most important arguments in favor of
carbon pricing.
Argument 1: As Carbon Pricing Alters Relative
Prices, Firms and Consumers Automatically
Internalize Global Warming Effects
Carbon pricing changes relative prices of all goods
and services in accordance with the Polluter Pays
Principle. As a consequence, when making deci-
sions that cause GHG emissions, ﬁrms, consumers,
and investors consider not just their private costs
and beneﬁts, but also the social costs associated
with (direct and indirect) emissions generated in
every phase of the product life cycle, from resource
to waste. The entire economy then becomes less
carbon intensive, since all consumers and produ-
cers will adjust their decisions to prices corrected
for the climate externality. To obtain the same
result with nonprice instruments would require
that the regulator possesses all relevant informa-
tion about emissions and abatement options to
control in detail all polluting processes and beha-
viors. This would evidently be extremely difﬁcult
and imply a huge cost of governance.
Carbon pricing means that the prices of fos-
sil energy fuels will adequately reﬂect the carbon
content of these fuels. As a result, industries that
use more carbon-intense fuels will face higher
input costs and thus ask higher output prices from
their customers. In turn, sectors using these out-
puts as inputs will also see their output prices go
up. Finally, consumers buying products or services
from the latter sectors will confront higher prices
as well. As all these agents are motivated to pur-
chase the cheaper input, product or service, a shift
will occur to options with relatively low direct
and indirect emissions. In other words, with a
fairly simple carbon-pricing policy on fossil fuels
each price in the economy will be corrected so as
to reﬂect in some way the overall CO2 emissions
effect of the associated good or service. This
means that no economic decision escapes the regu-
latory effect of carbon pricing—it is a systemic
solution. This does not mean carbon pricing is the
complete and only solution: as discussed in the
More Than Carbon Pricing section, complemen-
tary instruments are needed, because of informa-
tional failures and bounded rationality, among
others.
Argument 2: Carbon Pricing Accounts for
Heterogeneity of Emitters, Which Reduces
the Overall Abatement Cost
Compared to other types of instruments, carbon pri-
cing can address the vast heterogeneity of GHG
emitters, thus helping to minimize the cost of pollu-
tion control. Heterogeneity might result from ﬁrms
producing diverse goods or having distinct technolo-
gies, and thus different emissions per unit of output,
which translates into unequal marginal costs of pol-
lution abatement. Under perfect information and
substantive rationality, all polluters should choose
that level of emissions abatement for which the
associated marginal cost equals the carbon price.
Hence, with a carbon price signal, the marginal
abatement costs would become equal among all pol-
luters, implying that a given level of abatement is
met at least global cost. No other instrument than
pricing is able to realize the same outcome. Since
polluters show inertia or are not always perfectly
aware of available abatement technologies and asso-
ciated costs, one should expect the global cost to
not reach the exact lowest level. Nevertheless,
empirical research suggests that reliance on nonprice
policy instruments often leads to considerably
higher abatement costs.5,6 The reason is that such
instruments are less effective in covering diverse
sources of emissions. For example, it is impossible
to implement technical standards for the millions of
technologies and products worldwide, and moreo-
ver update these frequently to account for nonstop
technical innovation. To illustrate, two studies
show, using different models, that a fuel economy
standard for cars results in considerably higher costs
of reducing CO2 emissions than fuel taxes.
7,8 Note
that older empirical studies found the abatement
costs of uniform standards to be up to a factor
22 higher than those of pricing instruments.9
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Argument 3: Carbon Pricing Provides a
Continuous Incentive for Adoption and
Innovation of Carbon-Efﬁcient Technologies
Carbon pricing contributes to so-called dynamic efﬁ-
ciency as it stimulates innovation and adoption of
technologies emitting less carbon. By increasing the
cost of carbon-emitting technologies and activities,
carbon pricing provides a ﬁnancial incentive for con-
sumers and producers to invest in technologies redu-
cing emissions. This not only encourages more
adoption of existing low-carbon technologies, but
also indirectly promotes the development of new
ones. Empirical evidence suggests a positive relation-
ship between higher energy prices and the develop-
ment of more energy-efﬁcient technologies.10
Compared with emission or technology-based stan-
dards, carbon pricing provides a continuous and
stronger economic incentive for adoption of, and
R&D on, improved abatement technologies. Econo-
metric studies ﬁnd that under stable energy prices,
innovations generally reduce consumer prices, while
after oil price hikes, they tend to make equipment
more energy efﬁcient.11 This suggests that carbon pri-
cing is an essential element of a policy package aimed
at redirecting technical change towards the cleaner
goods and ways of production. Further support for
this comes from a comprehensive theoretical
analysis.12
Examining the effect of the European carbon
market (EU-ETS) on innovation, one study ﬁnds that
carbon pricing is responsible for a 10% increase in
clean innovation (measured by patents), in spite of
the relatively low prices experienced so far.13
Another study provides additional evidence on the
innovation effects of EU-ETS.14 Both conﬁrm the
results of an earlier patent-based study that energy
prices have the largest inducement effect on energy-
related innovations.15 A third study analyses 3412
ﬁrm-level patent data from 80 countries for the car
industry between 1965 and 2005, concluding that
ﬁrms tend to innovate more in clean technologies
when they face higher tax-inclusive fuel prices.16
Corrected prices are essential to rapid innova-
tion in the right direction, as relative prices steer
innovation opportunities and associated investments.
This aspect is underappreciated in many discussions
about technological change and climate change,
where pricing is downplayed as if innovation/diffu-
sion subsidies and other innovation policies, such as
information provision or stimulating cooperation
between innovators, were sufﬁcient. To fully appreci-
ate the subtlety of this point, it should be recognized
that rather than current carbon or energy prices,
expectations about future prices are relevant.17 Of
course, a high carbon price today acts as a signal for
the near and more distant future, so that it will con-
tribute to stimulating investments and R&D with the
aim to reduce dependence on high carbon energy in
all sectors of the economy.
Argument 4: Carbon Pricing Represents the
Most Effective Way to Limit Energy/Carbon
Rebound
The issue of energy rebound and how carbon pricing
could mitigate it has received little attention in the
public debate on carbon pricing. One reason may be
that this argument was neglected by previous com-
prehensive reviews of environmental policy analy-
sis.18,19 In line with this, rebound has so far not been
considered a standard criterion in environmental pol-
icy analysis.
Rebound denotes that energy conservation,
including through adoption of more energy-efﬁcient
technologies, can indirectly create additional energy
uses and associated emissions. Hence, the net conser-
vation effect will be lower than the initial energy
savings—or even negative in some cases, known as
Jevons paradox. Rebound involves diffusion of tech-
nologies as well as various economic mechanisms.
Technological advances and improvements in energy
efﬁciency tend to lead to a direct reduction in energy
consumption. However, given the improved efﬁ-
ciency, the energy services—for instance, traveling by
car—become cheaper, which stimulates more inten-
sive use of these services. Moreover, money saved
due to more energy efﬁciency will increase spending
on other goods and services, and hence associated
energy use and emissions.20
Compared to other policy instruments, oppor-
tunities for such rebound effect are limited if carbon
pricing is in place, because it is a systems approach
that reduces rebound consistently across all carbon-
intensive goods and technologies.21 Such pricing
would discourage money savings due to energy con-
servation to be spent on energy-intensive goods and
services, as the latter will have a higher price due to
carbon pricing. Empirical evidence suggests that such
‘re-spending rebound’ is non-negligible and deserves
serious attention in policy design.22 Furthermore, in
many cases, carbon pricing can reduce absolute
rebound due to the direct rebound or intensity effect,
because it may partially compensate the fall in the
user (fuel) cost due to implementing more energy-
efﬁcient technologies (as in transport23). In these cir-
cumstances, the direct rebound effect on demand, in
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absolute terms, will be lower than in a situation with-
out carbon prices as then initial demand is higher.
Carbon pricing will further ensure that consu-
mers automatically, without even realizing, make a
trade-off between the individual beneﬁts of new or
higher energy consumption due to rebound and
related climate change damages.24 Indeed, carbon
pricing will mainly discourage rebound associated
with a price correction for environmental damage
costs exceeding direct individual beneﬁts of the
respective consumption decision.
Argument 5: Global Carbon Pricing Curtails
Emissions Leakage Between Countries
An international carbon price covering all countries
and sectors would ensure that there are no emission
leakages or spillovers, that is, increases in carbon diox-
ide emissions in some countries as a result of emissions
reduction in others.25,26 The mechanisms through
which this occurs are relocation of pollution-intensive
industries and shifts in comparative advantages that
alter international trade patterns, both driven by rela-
tive cost increases in countries with stricter regulations.
Although some empirical studies suggest modest com-
petitiveness effects of distinct environmental/climate
policies, this will not necessarily be the case under sce-
narios with stricter but differentiated national policies,
conceivable under the Paris climate agreement.27 With
a global carbon price, relative prices for all carbon-
intensive products will be consistent among all coun-
tries worldwide, guaranteeing the absence of carbon
leakage.
Obtaining such an ideal situation with no leak-
age would require effectively addressing the incen-
tives to free ride. Various ideas have been put
forward on how to overcome free riding in interna-
tional negotiations.28–33 In the absence of a global
agreement to implement a carbon price, unilateral cli-
mate policies by individual countries (or regions)
confront two main problems: loss of international
competiveness, which discourages political support
for a stringent unilateral climate policy; and carbon
leakage, which reduces the effectiveness of any uni-
lateral policy. Once a country applies carbon pricing
on its domestic goods, it could in principle also apply
it to imported goods, through a carbon-motivated
border tax adjustment or requirements of acquisition
of emission permits by importers when the policy is a
cap-and-trade system.34 This would level the playing
ﬁeld in the sense that comparative disadvantages due
to carbon pricing would be reduced or even annulled.
Several studies discuss technical aspects of carbon-
motivated border tax adjustments, and on how they
can be made consistent with World Trade Organization
(WTO) rules.35–38 In PE issue 4 in the section on Political
Economy Issues, we will discuss the political economy
aspects of free riding and possible strategies to overcome
it, to achieve international coordination of climate policy,
or even an effective climate agreement.
Argument 6: Carbon Pricing Decentralizes
Policy, Reducing Regulators’ Need for
Information
Carbon pricing is consistent with ﬂexibility and
autonomy of choice, allowing emitters to freely
change their behavior to reduce their costs. They can
opt for emitting and paying any charges or taxes
associated with emissions, or for undertaking a vari-
ety of activities, immediately or after relevant invest-
ments, to abate emissions. Carbon pricing thus
means decentralization of policy, with associated low
information needs and administrative costs. In addi-
tion, carbon pricing implies low transactions costs
for ﬁrms, as, unlike eco-labeling, it requires no sepa-
rate life cycle analysis to account for all carbon diox-
ide emissions of products and services. Instead, ﬁrms
will integrate carbon prices in existing cost-
accounting systems of their products and services.
Argument 7: Carbon Pricing Takes into
Account that in Making Purchasing
Decisions, most Consumers are more
Inﬂuenced by Prices than by Environmental
Concerns
Even if one is environmentally conscious, it is impos-
sible to perfectly know which goods to buy and in
what amounts to achieve environmental goals. It is,
moreover, unthinkable that one can voluntarily con-
tribute to all public goods in the world.39 Even
though many people would like to contribute at a
personal cost to a more responsible use of the natural
environment, such cooperative behavior frequently
depends on the perception of what others will do.40
The fact that an individual action alone has a negligi-
ble impact tends to discourage most people to under-
take these voluntary actions. Moreover, many
consumers are not particularly environmentally con-
scious in their purchase behavior, being sensitive to
personally salient concerns, notably ﬁnancial consid-
erations, when making purchasing decisions. An
effective climate policy has to reach out to this group.
Carbon pricing is capable of doing this as it naturally
intervenes in a core element of markets, namely
prices of goods and services. It does so without the
WIREs Climate Change Carbon pricing in climate policy
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need for people to act altruistically, show voluntary
environmentally benign behavior, or have the ability
to handle much information about products as in the
form of eco-labels. This does not deny proenviron-
mental behavior.41,42 There is no clear evidence,
though, that voluntary action can overcome very
large differences in prices between green and dirty
products/services, nor that it applies to a large group
of consumers. Of course, policymakers are encour-
aged to leverage cooperative behavior when they
have the opportunity to do so, but this approach can-
not represent the main solution to climate change.
Probably the most relevant voluntary behavior is that
voters choose politicians who will strike a climate
agreement that supports effective climate policies
in all countries (see PE Issue 4 in the section on
Political Economy Issues). Once implemented, car-
bon pricing does not require proenvironmental
behavior. Nevertheless, the evidence available so
far suggests that, if anything, proenvironmental
behavior makes carbon pricing more effective,
which is all good for climate policy (PE Issue 5 in
section on Political Economy Issues).
MORE THAN CARBON PRICING:
INNOVATION POLICIES,
INFORMATION PROVISION, AND
OTHER INSTRUMENTS
As already hinted at in Argument 3 in the previous
section above, as carbon pricing and technology pol-
icy are largely complementary mechanisms they
should both form part of a climate policy package. In
the words of Bowen43: ‘Other policies are needed, too,
particularly to promote innovation and appropriate
infrastructure investment, but cannot be relied upon
by themselves to bring about the necessary reductions
in emissions. Carbon pricing is crucial.’ While carbon
pricing can internalize the global warming externality,
innovation subsidies are needed to internalize the posi-
tive, knowledge externalities of innovation, to pro-
mote escape from lock in, and to keep promising but
still expensive options open.44,45 With only carbon
pricing, there is a risk of a lock in of currently cost-
effective technologies (e.g., wind energy) while promis-
ing, but more expensive options in early stages of
development may not survive (e.g., certain solar
PV technologies). On the other hand, fostering a low-
carbon transition through innovation and/or adop-
tion/diffusion subsidies, that is, without carbon pri-
cing, is extremely difﬁcult, given that the emissions
externality would not be internalized. Even when
clean technologies develop and become less expensive,
emissions would then be insufﬁciently discouraged. As
soon as renewables were to become competitive, they
would likely trigger responses by fossil-fuel markets in
the form of lower fossil-fuel prices, thus making the
attainment of climate goals more difﬁcult. This type of
outcome is a special case of what is known as the
Green Paradox.46–49
Contrary to carbon pricing, subsidies aimed at
stimulating adoption and diffusion of renewable
energy do not target exactly the emission externality
and moreover generate a burden for public ﬁnances.50
Nevertheless, it may be hard to convince the public of
how ineffective they may be in changing behavior.
Yet, recent evidence in promoting renewables suggests
that the implicit carbon price of subsidies for adopting
solar energy is in the order of magnitude of 550 €/
tCO2 for the period 2006–2010 in Germany
51 and of
1000 €/tCO2 from 2008 to 2011 in Italy.52 These
amounts are considerably higher than any currently
discussed carbon prices, indicating that a counterfac-
tual world with carbon pricing would for the same
overall cost have achieved much more carbon dioxide
emissions reduction.
In view of informational failures and bounded
rationality, carbon pricing may be supplemented with
mechanisms that aid households and businesses
respond effectively to market signals and incen-
tives.53 Bounded rationality involves a broad set of
behavioral features, such as decision heuristics,
habits, conformism, imitation, status seeking, inter-
temporal choice, effects of information framing, and
other-regarding preferences. The associated literature
on policy design provides especially useful advice
for information framing, on choice options
(e.g., presenting a greener product as the default
option, or providing information about how many
neighbors already purchased it), or on explaining cli-
mate policy to voters (e.g., when framing a tradable
permit system, rather than employing the term
‘permits,’ which stresses the interpretation of ‘right
to pollute,’ one might refer to ‘emission penalties’41).
In addition, information provision to citizens
and ﬁrms about the opportunities to reduce GHG
emissions would increase the impact of carbon pri-
cing.54 Recent research suggests that the price elastic-
ity of demand may be higher with long-lasting
carbon taxes than with temporary price
ﬂuctuations.55–58 In view of this, media coverage and
communication campaigns might aim at improving
public understanding of the need for carbon pricing,
clarifying it is meant to signal carbon-intensive goods
and services. Information might further stress it is a
permanent measure, thus limiting uncertainty about
future prices for consumers and investors.59
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The above list of considerations regarding com-
plementary policies is not exhaustive. Well-tailored
policies, not necessarily based on prices, are needed
to control emissions from sources other than energy
production and use, such as land conversion, for-
estry, or landﬁll emissions. Ideally, pricing nonenergy
sources of GHG emissions would allow lowering
even further the cost of climate policy,60 but this may
be relatively hard to do in practice. Another aspect of
complementary policy is removing existing market
imperfections to improve the performance of carbon
pricing. For instance, one study compares energy
efﬁciency standards with carbon pricing through
cap-and-trade and ﬁnd that the differences get less
pronounced if there is interaction with existing taxes
on inputs other than energy and carbon, or if there
are preexisting tax distortions, as is common in the
case of capital.61 By removing such distortions, car-
bon taxes would become even more effective.
Finally, not all complementary policies or mea-
sures are desirable. To illustrate this, we highlight
that the effectiveness of carbon taxes is, contrary to
what many believe, not dependent on the use of rev-
enues for funding ‘environmental projects.’ It is quite
common, though, to hear in public debates the idea
expressed that revenues of environmental taxes
should always be used for the environment. But this
is not supported by insights from environmental eco-
nomics. Carbon taxes are regulatory, not ﬁnancing
instruments. Of course, earmarking carbon tax rev-
enues, or revenues of auctioned emission permits, for
environmental projects or other issues, can be done
to increase the acceptability of carbon pricing, but
one should always bear in mind that its main objec-
tive is altering behavior. In the next section, we
address the question of acceptability in more detail.
POLITICAL ECONOMY ISSUES
ASSOCIATED WITH CARBON PRICING
This paper does not aim at addressing exhaustively
the political economy (PE) of carbon pricing. We
nevertheless brieﬂy discuss six issues, namely distri-
butional equity, lobbying, co-beneﬁts, international
policy coordination, crowding in/out, and long-term
commitment.
PE Issue 1: Distributional Consequences of
Carbon Pricing
Much resistance against carbon pricing is motivated
by concerns that it will be inequitable, that is, have
regressive distributional effects in terms of income or
consumers’ purchasing power. Of course, any serious
climate policy could have similar, undesirable distri-
butional impacts. In the case of carbon pricing, how-
ever, regressive impacts are not inevitable. They can
be avoided through appropriate policy design or
complementary measures. Moreover, when consider-
ing the distributive consequences of carbon pricing, it
is important to compare these to alternative scenar-
ios, notably business-as-usual (no climate policies)
and climate mitigation policies with alternative, and
less effective, instruments. For instance, many studies
show that unmitigated climate change impacts would
be unequal among countries and that poorest coun-
tries will be more affected than richer.62
Paradoxically, carbon pricing provides an
excellent instrument to address undesirable distribu-
tional consequences—notably if taking the form of
carbon taxation, but also of emissions trading, if ini-
tial permits are auctioned or sold. The reason is that
it will generate public revenues that can be used to
compensate low-income households, for example,
through tax reductions for low incomes or energy
poor households, or lower value-added tax (VAT)
rates for products serving basic needs.63–65 Progres-
sive effects can also be obtained by lump sum redis-
tribution, which represents the simplest and
administratively less burdensome way of recycling
revenues from carbon pricing.66–68
Any remaining distributional impacts of carbon
pricing have to be compared with those resulting
from climate change or other climate policy instru-
ments. For example, technical standards will not nec-
essarily guarantee an equitable distribution of
emissions reductions and associated monetary and
welfare costs. In particular, they will also raise costs
and thus prices, but not generate extra public reven-
ues that could be used to lessen perceived unfair dis-
tributive impacts. In a review of arguments and
empirical studies, one study warns that assessing dis-
tributional effects of environmental policy (any
instrument, not only pricing) is a difﬁcult task, as it
involves six elements: (1) higher prices of carbon-
intensive products, (2) changes in relative returns to
factors such as labor, capital, and resources, (3) allo-
cation of scarcity rents from a restricted number of
tradable permits in the case these are initially freely
distributed, (4) distribution of the beneﬁts from
improvements in environmental quality, (5) tempo-
rary effects during the transition, and (6) capitaliza-
tion of all those effects into prices of property values
(land, buildings, and houses).69 A full assessment
should account for all of them, which clariﬁes the
huge challenge to comprehensively address distribu-
tive impacts of policy. It means one should be careful
in quickly judging a particular instrument, like
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carbon pricing, negatively from the angle of equity. It
should further be noted that in the case of climate
change, the beneﬁciaries of reducing emissions are
future generations, notably people living in poor
countries. Hence, carbon pricing can contribute to
both intra- and intergenerational equity.
A general ﬁnding of the literature on acceptabil-
ity of climate policy, and in particular of carbon
taxes, is that people tend to have a strong preference
for designs that protect low-income households.70–73
Concern about income inequality is among the main
reasons why 92% of voters (more than two million
people) in a public ballot held in Switzerland in 2015
rejected a proposal for an energy tax to replace the
national VAT.74 The authors of this study show,
using a choice experiment administered at the same
time of the ballot, that acceptability is much higher
when a progressive energy tax is proposed, provided
that information on its distributional properties are
made salient.
When considering redistribution effects of cli-
mate policies, one should realize that a subsidy scheme
for adopting renewable energy—not to be confused
with innovation subsidies as discussed in the More
Than Carbon Pricing section—may be regressive as
well, namely when it involves a considerable transfer
of money to homeowners, notably for installing solar
PV panels on roofs. This type of scheme was intro-
duced in a number of countries (e.g., Germany and
Switzerland) as carbon pricing turned out to be unpop-
ular. But, as argued, subsidies do not necessarily per-
form better, neither on (cost-)effectiveness nor on
equity. The distributional effect should be carefully
analyzed in each speciﬁc case as it will depend on the
precise design of the subsidy scheme.
PE Issue 2: Carbon Pricing and Lobbying
There is evidence that lobbying by energy-intensive
industries contributed to prevent the implementation
of carbon pricing in several countries,75–78 and may
have inﬂuenced voters’ perceptions about its poten-
tial drawbacks.79 Even where carbon-pricing schemes
were implemented, energy-intensive industries have
in many countries through lobbying managed to
receive a very favorable treatment, resulting in less
effective policies.77,80,81
Energy-intensive industries are, however, no
longer the only actors active in lobbying: we now
observe a situation in which ‘green organizations’
oppose ‘brown industries.’82 For instance, evidence
from British Columbia’s carbon tax stresses the
importance of environmental organizations in suc-
cessfully spreading support for it.2 Environmental
organizations need to stress, though, the beneﬁts of
carbon pricing, and be informed about potential
solutions to limit the drawbacks. Following decades
of lobbying against carbon pricing, misunderstand-
ings of, and ideological resistance against, this instru-
ment have permeated the public arena.
Recent developments including the Paris Agree-
ment seem to have shifted the opinion of many impor-
tant businesses in favor of carbon pricing. Indeed,
150 companies that report to the Carbon Disclosure
Project (CDP) are using internal carbon pricing as a
tool to internalize carbon dioxide emission costs and
drive investments in emissions abatement. Resulting
carbon prices range from US$6 to US$89/tCO2 equiva-
lent.83,84 A recent survey realized among more than
100 executives of large companies around the world
suggests that support for carbon pricing is strongly on
the rise.85 Almost half of the executives now declare to
be in favor of carbon pricing, while another large por-
tion states to be not against it. Moreover, a signiﬁcant
portion of respondents expects future climate negotia-
tions to bring about some form of carbon pricing, and
is ready to prepare for this scenario.
In countries that are credibly pursuing their
commitments to the Paris Agreement, industries
would do well to lobby for instruments, like some
form of carbon pricing, that provide them ﬂexibility
in choosing the means of abating emissions. Many
businesses already realize that carbon pricing is not a
bad option as it leaves them a free choice between
paying for emitting or abatement, while postponing
action only makes the cost of achieving a given target
higher.86,87 However, because carbon taxes and auc-
tioning of permits means considerable money transfer
from enterprises to public administrations, one
should expect many ﬁrms to continue lobbying
against carbon pricing.
PE Issue 3: Carbon Pricing and Co-Beneﬁts
Another political economy issue is local co-beneﬁts
playing in favor of carbon pricing. Examples of co-
beneﬁts are health beneﬁts of clean air due to less
local pollution, reduced energy costs due to improved
energy efﬁciency, or energy security and less depend-
ence on fossil energy imports due to more variety in
energy sources, including renewable energy.88,89
Cobeneﬁts also arise from other climate policies.
However, since carbon pricing should be expected to
be more effective in emissions reduction, as argued in
the Seven Arguments for Global Carbon Pricing sec-
tion, its co-beneﬁts are likely to be larger. In this
respect, we support those who argue that co-beneﬁts
can be a reason for countries to implement carbon
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pricing unilaterally, that is, in the absence of a bind-
ing climate agreement.90 A relatively high carbon
price, up to 63$ per ton of CO2-equivalent in the
case of China, could be justiﬁed based only on local
co-beneﬁts, that is, without accounting for climate
beneﬁts.91 The authors ﬁnd that even for the United
States, a carbon price of more than 30$ per ton of
CO2-equivalent is warranted by local co-beneﬁts.
Since co-beneﬁts can be reaped in the short term and
be appropriated by the country that implements car-
bon pricing, drawing more public attention to them
could increase its acceptability.73,92,93 Carbon pricing
may not be the best way to reduce local pollution,
and other complementary policies precisely targeting
harmful local pollutants might be preferable. But as
long as the latter policies are not, or unlikely to be,
implemented one can count reduction of local pollu-
tion due to climate policy as a relevant cobeneﬁt.
PE Issue 4: Carbon Pricing and
International Policy Coordination
The literature offers various suggestions to overcome
free riding and achieve international coordination of
carbon pricing. Nordhaus94 proposes a radical solu-
tion to deal with free riding and carbon leakage, tak-
ing the form of a climate club, the members of which
implement signiﬁcant trade tariffs on imports of non-
complying countries, regardless of the carbon con-
tent of the traded goods. These would serve as
incentives for nonmembers to join the club. Similarly
to carbon border tax adjustments, this proposal cre-
ates an incentive for other countries to implement
carbon pricing as well.
One proposal builds on the standard idea of a
carbon border tax and, to clarify that it is motivated
by environmental concerns and should not be inter-
preted by nonclub members as a protectionist meas-
ure, suggests to complement it with so-called revenue-
recycling offsets.95 This means that while the tariffs
reduce import demand for the carbon-intensive goods,
the associated revenues of the tariffs are uncondition-
ally returned to the exporting countries from where
the products subject to the tariff originate. This would
signal that the tariffs are meant to support climate pol-
icy, and are not a disguised form of protectionism or
aimed at raising public revenues.
Another political economy issue relates to what
type of effective climate policy is easier to negotiate
globally. A global carbon price would be an ideal
basis for negotiations aimed at worldwide commit-
ment as it is easy to agree upon, relatively fair (pend-
ing on equitable national and international
redistribution of receipts, see below), consistent with
energy policies already in place (e.g., fossil-fuel taxes
are common in most countries), and requiring rela-
tively little information (notably compared with an
agreement on climate technology standards).96 Two
relevant insights should be added to this.97 First,
whereas quantity negotiations involving n countries
imply dealing with an at least n-dimensional coordi-
nation problem, focusing on a global carbon price
comes down to a much simpler, one-dimensional
negotiation challenge. Second, a global carbon price
beneﬁts from a self-enforcement mechanism, given
that incentives are better aligned because the desire to
internalize the climate externality offsets the basic
urge of countries to bargain for a low national carbon
price. Such a mechanism is missing in the case of
national mitigation contributions as characterized the
Kyoto protocol and the Paris Agreement.
PE Issue 5: Carbon Pricing and
Motivational Crowding In/Out
Motivational crowding out may arise when ﬁnancial
incentives or punishments undermine intrinsic motiva-
tions to contribute to public goods,98–100 including
environmental policy or public goods issues.101 This
has stimulated critiques that (carbon) pricing may be
less effective than expected ex ante, because it would
reduce proenvironmental behavior of some indivi-
duals.102 However, various studies suggest that at the
aggregate level carbon taxes are, if anything, more
effective than predicted.55–58 Carbon pricing may actu-
ally contribute to motivational crowding in.103 At the
microeconomic level, we are not aware of any occur-
rence of considerable crowding out due to carbon pri-
cing. One may wonder why there is so much concern
about motivational crowding out.104–106 Backed by
experimental data and a survey among economists, a
recent study concludes that a plausible reason is that
certain inﬂuential, early publications as the ones men-
tioned above have been interpreted as demonstrating
that crowding out was a general phenomenon, whereas
it only applies to particular settings.107
PE Issue 6: Carbon Pricing and Long-Term
Commitment
An effective climate policy requires that there is long-
term commitment for a credible carbon price signal.
This can be achieved with both options as discussed
in the Two Ways of Implementing Carbon section.
The cap-and-trade system provides a guarantee for
long-term commitment with policy goals as the sys-
tem, once in place, will assure a carbon price that
keeps emissions within the cap. If, on the other hand,
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governments pledge to a carbon tax schedule over
time, supported by an international agreement, then
commitment is arranged too. One can observe that
carbon tax rates have been kept constant or gradually
increased over time in all countries in which they have
been applied. Likewise, in every later phase of emis-
sions trading schemes, increased stringency was
strived for. This is illustrated by the EU-ETS, which
has broadened its scope both in term of number of
countries and of activities covered, and has progres-
sively used auctioning instead of free allocation.108
To date, the only meaningful example of policy rever-
sal is Australia, whereas the ‘carbon club’ of countries
applying increasingly stringent policy is steadily
increasing in size.77,84 This underpins long-term com-
mitment regarding a carbon price.
While credibility of a long-term policy commit-
ment is not easy to achieve, this may improve when
policy reversals are discouraged by introducing com-
mitment devices. To illustrate, the well-known carbon
tax of British Columbia was introduced with a com-
mitment device imposing on the regulator a prede-
ﬁned tax escalator (i.e., a set path for future price
hikes) and the obligation to reduce revenues from
other taxes (mainly on income) to compensate for car-
bon tax revenues. The incentive effect of this was con-
ﬁrmed by a recent review.2 Switzerland has opted for
an automatic carbon tax adjustment system. If emis-
sions levels are above an emissions path that has to be
followed to reach the abatement objective as speciﬁed
in the CO2 Act, then the carbon tax rate is automati-
cally raised. This ensures that carbon tax rates are not
affected by political cycles. Incidentally, one should
realize that commitment to any serious climate policy
will be difﬁcult and require appropriate design, that
is, this problem is not unique to carbon pricing.
TWO WAYS OF IMPLEMENTING
CARBON PRICING GLOBALLY
One can achieve a unique worldwide carbon price
using a global carbon tax or a global emissions trad-
ing system. While the ﬁrst approach sets the carbon
price directly through an administrative decision, the
second sets a cap on emissions and allocates the
emission allowances between emitters. Emissions
trading then results in a carbon price. Both
approaches satisfy the general favorable properties
mentioned in previous sections. In addition, each
approach has particular advantages and disadvan-
tages, as discussed below. Hence, there is not an une-
quivocally better alternative, which explains why
each option has its own advocates.
Carbon Pricing Through a Carbon Tax
There are two possible international carbon tax
designs, both of which require an international cli-
mate agreement. One is a global carbon tax, the rev-
enues of which would be collected centrally, for
example, through the UNFCCC Secretariat, and sub-
sequently redistributed among countries in relation
to their demographic weight or other criteria. Despite
its political difﬁculty, this alternative has the advan-
tage of a single worldwide carbon price. It would,
moreover, generate positive international redistribu-
tive effects given the positive correlation between per
capita GHG emissions and per capita income. A
main advantage of a carbon tax is that it generates
revenues over time that allow complementing it with
redistribution policies to ameliorate any undesired
inequitable effects of the tax. In addition, a part of
the carbon tax revenues might be allocated to inno-
vation and adoption/diffusion subsidies or to the pro-
vision of green funds ﬁnancing environmental
projects or adaptation measures in poorer countries.
Public acceptability studies show that using carbon
tax revenues in these ways can often increase their
social and political acceptability.1
While a global carbon tax would imply ﬁnan-
cial transfers from rich to poor countries, one should
realize that any serious climate policy, price-based or
not, will require such ﬁnancial transfers. However, as
carbon taxes as well as carbon markets—through ini-
tial sales or auctioning of permits—generate consid-
erable public revenues, with carbon pricing rich
countries are more likely to provide ﬁnancial support
to poorer countries than with other policy instru-
ments (notably quantity regulation or technical stan-
dards), as these do not generate public revenues.
Absent any transfer, carbon prices should be lower in
poor countries, as the marginal valuation of con-
sumption is higher there, because of diminishing
returns of consumption in utility, and thus the mar-
ginal cost of abatement should also be lower.109
However, as distinct carbon tax levels between coun-
tries reduce effectiveness, due to carbon leakage (see
Argument 5 in the section on Seven Arguments for
Global Carbon Pricing), transfers—which in effect
are motivated by the same argument of different mar-
ginal values of consumption—are preferable.
An alternative to a global tax is an interna-
tional agreement that partially harmonizes national
carbon taxes, requiring a minimum common rate.
This would contribute to the cost-effectiveness of the
allocation of global abatement efforts among coun-
tries. In comparison with a genuine global tax, under
this option redistribution of revenues between coun-
tries would be more complicated. In the near term,
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measures as discussed in PE Issue 4 in the section on
Political Economy Issues, namely carbon border tax
adjustment or more generally trade sanctions, could
reduce free riding and promote wide participation
in an international agreement. As a carbon tax
might be difﬁcult to apply straight away in some
low-income countries, in a preliminary stage, one
could aim for at least a reduction in fossil-fuel subsi-
dies equivalent to the increase in prices in developed
countries.110 The avoided expenditures could be
used to ameliorate any negative distributive impact
of such policy reform. This might facilitate a broad
participation of developing countries in a ﬁrst stage
and their adoption of a harmonized carbon tax in a
later stage.
Carbon Pricing Through Emissions Trading
An international emissions trading system could also
take different forms. A truly global market would
cover all emission sources, giving rise to a single car-
bon price worldwide. This would assure cost-
effectiveness of emissions abatement at a global level.
This works as follows. The emissions cap set by the
regulator would be motivated by an agreed upon
long-term climate goal (such as maximally 1.5C or
2C global warming). A consistent number of per-
mits is then given, sold or auctioned among the emit-
ters from all countries. Global emissions trading
among emitters then translates the scarcity of permits
into a global carbon price. This price will be affected
by incomes, demand-price relations for carbon-
intensive goods and services, and technologies in the
global economy. This means individual agents do not
need to have a long-term vision or goal—this is only
required from the global regulator in order to set an
adequate cap. The carbon market price will then
ensure that all decisions by all economic actors in the
global economy are in line with the long-term
climate goal.
Nevertheless, creating such a global emission
trading system is very challenging in both political
and institutional terms. An ideal international treaty
would ﬁx a global emissions cap and then distribute
allowances between countries, which could trade
them, resulting in a global carbon price. If all coun-
tries distributed their allowances among their ﬁrms, a
cost-effective international market could be estab-
lished. However, similarly to carbon taxes, it would
probably be politically easier to start with distinct
emissions trading systems covering certain countries
and regions (like the EU), and integrate these globally
in a subsequent stage to ultimately cover all countries
and sectors. Indeed, various cap-and-trade systems
have been developed in North America, Europe, and
Asia, forming a fertile basis for integration at a lar-
ger, global scale. There are already examples of lin-
kages between emissions trading systems, such as
those that exist between California and Quebec.
As in the case of carbon taxes, some developing
countries may be reluctant to participate. A possible
approach is to link the carbon markets of developed
countries to an emission-reduction-credit (ERC) sys-
tem based on projects reducing emissions in develop-
ing countries, thus exploiting their low-cost
mitigation opportunities.110 Such a design would
open the door to a truly global carbon pricing system
in these countries. However, an ERC system is still
very controversial as it faces various problems, such
as assuring ‘additionality’ (abatement that would not
have occurred without carbon pricing) and allowing
for perverse, counterproductive effects.111 Problems
of this kind should be analyzed before ERC can be
considered a viable option.112 Current controversies,
and ethical-equity considerations, have discouraged
the use of the ERC system in the EU-ETS.108 Similar
controversies concern the Californian ETS. A recent
paper113 tackles the question of the acceptability of
international carbon offsets experimentally. Partici-
pants face the decision to fund domestic or interna-
tional reforestation programs, knowing that the same
emissions reductions are provided by a local or an
international tree, but domestic trees are much more
expensive. Randomized treatments making even
more salient the price differential contribute to the
popularity of international offsets, in particular
among individuals with strong environmental prefer-
ences, suggesting that transfers between developed
and developing countries may be facilitated by stres-
sing the related environmental gains.
As with the redistribution of carbon taxes rev-
enues, setting rules of allocation of allowances
among countries and emitters in each country is a
major hurdle, because they reﬂect implicit ethical and
political choices. The grandfathering approach used
in many programs favors large emitters and penalizes
those who made mitigation efforts before the policy
implementation.114 As a result, there is now broader
support for initializing systems through auctioning
permits, also because it improves the efﬁciency of the
overall tax and permit system, namely by using the
auction revenues to reduce distortionary taxes.115 As
for carbon taxes, distributional concern would play
in favor of either a redistribution of revenues from
permit auctions based on the demographic weights of
countries or the direct allocation of allowances on
per capita basis. Hence, both could be progressive in
terms of intercountry distribution and so address one
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of the criticisms to global carbon markets in particu-
lar and global carbon pricing in general.
Emissions trading systems have been criticized
for their volatility, which may be an important hand-
icap for long-term investments, as these depend not
only on current prices, but also on expectations
about future prices. However, carbon prices in emis-
sions trading systems do not necessarily have to be
extremely volatile. Price ﬂoors and ceilings (so-called
‘safety valves’) have been proposed to address the
issue of volatility. The latter comes down to a mixed
system, that is, a combination of tradable permits
and a tax,116 thus insuring against unexpectedly high
costs, one may convince ﬁrms to comply with, and
countries to participate in, carbon markets.110
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented seven reasons for using carbon
pricing in climate policy:
1. It changes relative prices to reﬂect all direct and
indirect GHG emissions of products and ser-
vices so that ﬁrms and consumers will automat-
ically internalize the costs to achieve a given
emissions abatement goal.
2. It minimizes the overall cost of pollution con-
trol as it accounts for differences (heterogene-
ity) between polluters in terms of abatement
opportunities and costs.
3. It contributes to dynamic efﬁciency, because it
provides continuous incentives for adoption
and innovation of new technologies that emit
fewer GHGs.
4. It is the best instrument to limit energy and car-
bon rebound in an effective way.
5. If it were to cover all countries and sectors, it
would ensure that there are no leakages
through international relocation of dirty indus-
tries and shifts in foreign trade patterns that
merely replace GHG emissions from one coun-
try to another.
6. It implies decentralization of policy, with asso-
ciated low information needs for regulators.
7. It builds on the empirical fact that when mak-
ing purchase decisions, most consumers are
more inﬂuenced by prices than by environmen-
tal concerns.
As a result, carbon pricing will be a very effective
instrument, for a given cost of abatement. While the
economic literature on environmental policy
generally stresses the optimality of carbon pricing in
terms of maximum welfare or minimal abatement
costs, our arguments draw attention to the fact that
carbon pricing is more effective, at a reasonable cost,
in reducing emission than other approaches. This is
especially true when it is combined with some form
of innovation subsidies. This is not to deny the
importance of the relatively low global abatement
cost of carbon pricing compared to other instru-
ments, but we believe that its high effectiveness in
reducing GHG emissions has been somewhat
neglected in many popular accounts, while it should
matter equally for political feasibility. We stress that
corrected prices are also essential for environmental
innovation as they affect innovation opportunities.
This is seriously underappreciated in the public
debate on technological change and climate change.
Here, pricing is often downplayed, while the errone-
ous view is widespread that to stimulate innovation
and diffusion attention should be focused only on
subsidies, or other innovation policies. But as argued,
carbon pricing and innovation policies are predomi-
nantly complementary and hence an effective climate
policy mix should include them both.
Many countries already have implemented poli-
cies to stimulate climate change mitigation, including
carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes.84,117
Some early examples of carbon taxes and emissions
trading schemes may have been or seemed relatively
ineffective, due mainly to excessive generosity in
handling emissions allowances, very low tax rates, or
exemptions. But this does not argue against the pol-
icy instrument. The observed lack of stringency was
mainly due to a lack of effective international coordi-
nation of climate policies. Emissions pledges have
been at the center of climate negotiations preparing
for COP21 in Paris. We believe that negotiating
around a single price will become easier as more
countries get involved in carbon pricing and an
increasing number of people become well informed
about its unique advantages.
A concern sometimes raised is that uncertainty
about the social cost of carbon (SCC), or assessing a
monetary SCC value in the ﬁrst place, translates into
uncertainty about the appropriate value of a carbon
price. While such uncertainty about the SCC indeed
exists, support seems to be increasing for the view
that it is higher than 100 US$ per ton CO2, as indi-
cated by recent surveys.118,119 One should realize,
though, that controversy about the SCC value is not
at all a barrier in implementing a carbon price. If
using cap-and-trade, the cap—set in accordance with
a political climate or emissions goal like the two-
centigrade target—will determine the adequate price
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level. If using a carbon tax, then a rising tax schedule
has to be applied until the responses by consumers
and producers are in line with the same climate goal.
In other words, the reality of carbon pricing is not
limited by academic controversies on the possibility
of deﬁning and estimating an optimal level of pollu-
tion. One can defend the necessity of pricing carbon
and at the same time be rather skeptical about the
concept of an optimal carbon price. Since we are
now in a post-Paris world, the trajectory for carbon
pricing is for the time being determined by the Paris
goals. However, the national pledges of the Paris cli-
mate agreement are far from cost-effective, in the
sense that some countries will have much higher mar-
ginal abatement costs than others, so that the global
cost to reach the same emissions abatement objective
will be unnecessarily excessive. Paris’ pledges are
merely a ﬁrst step, insufﬁcient by itself, to avoid dan-
gerous interferences with the climate system. In view
of this, our proposal is not to be satisﬁed with the
Paris pledges and just achieve them through carbon
pricing, but to go beyond the Paris agreement. A
global carbon price would facilitate this, as it would
achieve a not overly expensive outcome using an
effective instrument.
In view of the seven advantages of carbon pri-
cing and the additional considerations, including the
various political economy issues, we should remove
ideological barriers against such a critical element of
an effective climate policy package. Anyone who is
critical of carbon pricing needs to address these seven
proarguments, and present an alternative policy
approach that guarantees a similar effectiveness in
reducing GHG emissions against reasonable cost. As
we have argued, however, all alternative options are
likely to result in considerably less effective, even
though well intended, ways of regulating emissions
and thus are likely to be unable to avoid dangerous
climate change. We hope to have convinced the
reader that among all instruments carbon pricing
deserves the most serious attention from researchers,
politicians, and citizens.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Baranzini and Carattini received ﬁnancial support from the Swiss Federal Ofﬁce of Energy, and Carattini addi-
tional support from the Swiss National Science Foundation, grant P2SKP1_165028, and from COST Action
IS1309 ‘Innovations in Climate Governance: Sources, Patterns and Effects’ (INOGOV). Padilla and Roca
acknowledge support from projects ECO2015-67524-R (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad) and
2014SGR950 (Generalitat de Catalunya). van den Bergh’s research beneﬁted from a María-de-Maeztu
Excellent Unit grant awarded to ICTA-UAB. We are grateful to Alex Bowen and three anonymous reviewers
for useful comments.
REFERENCES
1. Drews S, van den Bergh JCJM. What explains public
support for climate policies? A review of empirical and
experimental studies. Clim Policy 2016, 16:855–876.
2. Murray B, Rivers N. British Columbia’s revenue-
neutral carbon tax: a review of the latest ‘grand
experiment’ in environmental policy. Energy Policy
2015, 86:674–683.
3. Carattini S, Baranzini A, Lalive R. Is Taxing Waste a
Waste of Time? Evidence from a Supreme Court
Decision. London: Grantham Research Institute on
Climate Change and the Environment; 2016.
4. Jenkins JD. Political economy constraints on carbon
pricing policies: what are the implications for eco-
nomic efﬁciency, environmental efﬁcacy, and climate
policy design? Energy Policy 2014, 69:467–477.
5. Pizer WA. Combining price and quantity controls to
mitigate global climate change. J Public Econ 2002,
85:409–434.
6. Fischer C, Newell RG. Environmental and technology
policies for climate mitigation. J Environ Econ Manag
2008, 55:142–162.
7. Krupnick AJ, Parry IW, Walls M, Knowles T,
Hayes K. Toward a New National Energy Policy:
Assessing the Options. Washington, DC: Resources
for the Future; 2010.
8. Parry IWH, Evans D, Oates WE. Are energy efﬁciency
standards justiﬁed? J Environ Econ Manag 2014,
67:104–125.
9. Tietenberg TH. Economic instruments for environ-
mental regulation. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 1990,
6:17–33.
10. Ambec S, Cohen MA, Elgie S, Lanoie P. The Porter
hypothesis at 20: can environmental regulation
enhance innovation and competitiveness? Rev Envi-
ron Econ Policy 2013, 7:2–22.
11. Jaffe AB, Stavins RN. Dynamic incentives of environ-
mental regulations: the effects of alternative policy
WIREs Climate Change Carbon pricing in climate policy
Volume 8, Ju ly /August 2017 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 13 of 17
instruments on technology diffusion. J Environ Econ
Manag 1995, 29:S43–S63.
12. Acemoglu D, Aghion P, Bursztyn L, Hemous D. The
environment and directed technical change. Am Econ
Rev 2012, 102:131–166.
13. Calel R, Dechezleprêtre A. Environmental policy and
directed technological change: evidence from the
European carbon market. Rev Econ Stat 2016,
98:173–191.
14. Schmidt TS, Schneider M, Rogge KS, Schuetz MJA,
Hoffmann VH. The effects of climate policy on the
rate and direction of innovation: a survey of the EU
ETS and the electricity sector. Environ Innov Soc
Transit 2012, 2:23–48.
15. Popp D. Innovation in climate policy models: imple-
menting lessons from the economics of R&D. Energy
Econ 2006, 28:596–609.
16. Aghion P, Dechezleprêtre A, Hémous D, Martin R,
Van Reenen J. Carbon taxes, path dependency, and
directed technical change: evidence from the auto
industry. J Polit Econ 2016, 124:1–51.
17. Jaffe AB, Newell RG, Stavins RN. Handbook Envi-
ron Econ 2003, 1:461–516.
18. Goulder LH, Parry IWH. Instrument choice in envi-
ronmental policy. Rev Environ Econ Policy 2008,
2:152–174.
19. Aldy JE, Krupnick AJ, Newell RG, Parry IWH,
Pizer WA. Designing climate mitigation policy.
J Econ Lit 2010, 48:903–934.
20. Sorrell S. The Rebound Effect: An Assessment of the
Evidence for Economy-Wide Energy Savings from
Improved Energy Efﬁciency. London: UK Energy
Research Centre; 2007.
21. van den Bergh JCJM. Energy conservation more
effective with rebound policy. Environ Resour Econ
2011, 48:43–58.
22. Antal M, van den Bergh JCJM. Re-spending rebound: a
macro-level assessment for OECD countries and emer-
ging economies. Energy Policy 2014, 68:585–590.
23. Frondel M, Peters J, Vance C. Identifying the
rebound: evidence from a German household panel.
Energy J 2008, 29:145–163.
24. Chan NW, Gillingham K. The microeconomic theory
of the rebound effect and its welfare implications.
J Assoc Environ Resour Econ 2015, 2:133–159.
25. Babiker MH. Climate change policy, market structure,
and carbon leakage. J Int Econ 2005, 65:421–445.
26. Fischer C, Fox AK. Comparing policies to combat
emissions leakage: border carbon adjustments versus
rebates. J Environ Econ Manag 2012, 64:199–216.
27. Dechezleprêtre A, Sato M. The Impacts of Environmen-
tal Regulations on Competitiveness. London: London
School of Economics and Political Science; 2014.
28. Carraro C, Siniscalco D. Strategies for the interna-
tional protection of the environment. J Public Econ
1993, 52:309–328.
29. Barrett S. Self-enforcing international environmental
agreements. Oxf Econ Pap 1994, 46:878–894.
30. Carraro C, Siniscalco D. International institutions and
environmental policy: international environmental
agreements: incentives and political economy. Eur
Econ Rev 1998, 42:561–572.
31. Barrett S. Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy
of Environmental Treaty-Making. Oxford: Oxford
University Press; 2006.
32. Heitzig J, Lessmann K, Zou Y. Self-enforcing strate-
gies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitiga-
tion game and other repeated public good games.
Proc Natl Acad Sci 2011, 108:15739–15744.
33. Gsottbauer E, van den Bergh JCJM. Bounded ration-
ality and social interaction in negotiating a climate
agreement. Int Environ Agreem Polit Law Econ
2012, 13:225–249.
34. Houser T, Bradley R, Childs B, Werksman J,
Heilmayr R. Leveling the Carbon Playing Field: Inter-
national Competition and Us Climate Policy Design.
Washington, DC: Peterson Institute; 2008.
35. Mattoo A, Subramanian A, van der Mensbrugghe D,
He J. Reconciling Climate Change and Trade Policy.
Washington, DC: The World Bank; 2009.
36. Cottier T, Nartova O, Bigdeli SZ, eds. International
Trade Regulation and the Mitigation of Climate
Change: World Trade Forum. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; 2009.
37. Jakob M, Steckel JC, Edenhofer O. Consumption-
versus production-based emission policies. Annu Rev
Resour Econ 2014, 6:297–318.
38. Rocchi P, Arto I, Roca J, Serrano M. Carbon-
Motivated Border Tax Adjustment: A Proposal for
the EU. Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona; 2015.
39. Nyborg K, Howarth RB, Brekke KA. Green consu-
mers and public policy: on socially contingent moral
motivation. Resour Energy Econ 2006, 28:351–366.
40. Ostrom E. A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Cli-
mate Change. Washington, DC: The World Bank; 2009.
41. Gsottbauer E, van den Bergh JCJM. Environmental pol-
icy theory given bounded rationality and other-regarding
preferences. Environ Resour Econ 2011, 49:263–304.
42. Carattini S, Levin S, Tavoni A. Cooperation in the Cli-
mate Commons. London: Grantham Research Institute
on Climate Change and the Environment; 2017.
43. Bowen A. The case for carbon pricing. Policy Brief,
Grantham Research Institute in Climate Change and
the Environment, 2011.
44. Unruh GC. Escaping carbon lock-in. Energy Policy
2002, 30:317–325.
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
14 of 17 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Volume 8, July/August 2017
45. Jaffe AB, Newell RG, Stavins RN. A tale of two mar-
ket failures: technology and environmental policy.
Ecol Econ 2005, 54:164–174.
46. Gerlagh R. Too much oil. CESifo Econ Stud 2011,
57:79–102.
47. Sinn H-W. Public policies against global warming: a
supply side approach. Int Tax Public Finance 2008,
15:360–394.
48. Sinn H-W. The Green Paradox: A Supply-Side Approach
to Global Warming. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2012.
49. Jensen S, Mohlin K, Pittel K, Sterner T. An introduc-
tion to the Green Paradox: the unintended conse-
quences of climate policies. Rev Environ Econ Policy
2015, 9:246–265.
50. Auerbach AJ, Hines JJ. Taxation and economic efﬁ-
ciency. In Auerbach AJ, Feldstein M, eds. Handbook of
Public Economics. vol. 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland,
Elsevier; 2002, 1347–1421.
51. Marcantonini C, Ellerman AD. The Implicit Carbon
Price of Renewable Energy Incentives in Germany.
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research,
Florence. Paper no. RSCAS 2014/28, 2014.
52. Marcantonini C, Valero V. Renewable Energy Incen-
tives and CO2 Abatement in Italy. Robert Schuman
Centre for Advanced Studies Research, Florence.
Paper no. RSCAS 2015/20, 2015.
53. Sanstad AH, Howarth RB. ‘Normal’ markets, market
imperfections and energy efﬁciency. Energy Policy
1994, 22:811–818.
54. Allcott H, Rogers T. the short-run and long-run
effects of behavioral interventions: experimental evi-
dence from energy conservation. Am Econ Rev 2014,
104:3003–3037.
55. Davis LW, Kilian L. Estimating the effect of a gaso-
line tax on carbon emissions. J Appl Econ 2011,
26:1187–1214.
56. Baranzini A, Weber S. Elasticities of gasoline demand
in Switzerland. Energy Policy 2013, 63:674–680.
57. Li S, Linn J, Muehlegger E. Gasoline taxes and con-
sumer behavior. Am Econ J Econ Policy 2014,
6:302–342.
58. Andersson J. Cars, Carbon Taxes and CO2 Emis-
sions. London: Grantham Research Institute on Cli-
mate Change and the Environment; 2015.
59. Antweiler W, Gulati S. Frugal Cars or Frugal Dri-
vers? How Carbon and Fuel Taxes Inﬂuence the
Choice and Use of Cars. Rochester, NY: Social Sci-
ence Research Network; 2016.
60. Weyant JP, de la Chesnaye FC, Blanford GJ. Over-
view of EMF-21: multigas mitigation and climate pol-
icy. Energy J 2006, 3:1–32.
61. Goulder LH, Hafstead MAC, Williams RC. General
equilibrium impacts of a Federal clean energy
standard†. Am Econ J Econ Policy 2016, 8:186–218.
62. Tol RSJ, Downing TE, Kuik OJ, Smith JB. Distribu-
tional aspects of climate change impacts. Glob Envi-
ron Change 2004, 14:259–272.
63. Harrison K. The Political Economy of British Colum-
bia’s Carbon Tax. Paris: Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development; 2013.
64. Bowen A. Carbon Pricing: How Best to Use the Reve-
nue? London: Grantham Research Institute on Cli-
mate Change and the Environment; 2015.
65. Thomas A, Flues F. The Distributional Effects of
Energy Taxes. OECD Taxation working papers, no.
23. Paris: OECD Publishing; 2015.
66. Baranzini A, Goldemberg J, Speck S. A future for car-
bon taxes. Ecol Econ 2000, 32:395–412.
67. Padilla E, Roca J. the proposals for a European
tax on CO2 and their implications for intercoun-
try distribution. Environ Resour Econ 2004,
27:273–295.
68. Metcalf GE. Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.-
S. greenhouse gas emissions. Rev Environ Econ Pol-
icy 2009, 3:63–83.
69. Fullerton D. Six Distributional Effects of Environ-
mental Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research; 2011.
70. Bristow AL, Wardman M, Zanni AM,
Chintakayala PK. Public acceptability of personal car-
bon trading and carbon tax. Ecol Econ 2010,
69:1824–1837.
71. Brannlund R, Persson L. To tax, or not to tax: prefer-
ences for climate policy attributes. Clim Policy 2012,
12:704–721.
72. Gevrek ZE, Uyduranoglu A. Public preferences for
carbon tax attributes. Ecol Econ 2015, 118:186–197.
73. Baranzini A, Carattini S. Effectiveness, earmarking
and labeling: testing the acceptability of carbon taxes
with survey data. Environ Econ Policy Stud 2016,
19:197–227.
74. Carattini S, Baranzini A, Thalmann P, Varone F,
Vöhringer F. Green Taxes in a Post-Paris World: Are
Millions of Nays Inevitable? London: Grantham
Research Institute on Climate Change and the Envi-
ronment; 2016.
75. Godal O, Holtsmark B. Greenhouse gas taxation and
the distribution of costs and beneﬁts: the case of Nor-
way. Energy Policy 2001, 29:653–662.
76. Bruvoll A, Larsen BM. Greenhouse gas emissions in
Norway: do carbon taxes work? Energy Policy 2004,
32:493–505.
77. Baranzini A, Carattini S. In: Freedman B, ed. Global
Environmental Change. Dordrecht: Springer Nether-
lands; 2014.
78. Rocchi P, Serrano M, Roca J. The reform of the European
energy tax directive: exploring potential economic impacts
in the EU27. Energy Policy 2014, 75:341–353.
WIREs Climate Change Carbon pricing in climate policy
Volume 8, Ju ly /August 2017 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 15 of 17
79. Spash CL, Lo AY. Australia’s carbon tax: a sheep in
wolf’s clothing? Econ Labour Relat Rev 2012,
23:67–85.
80. Demailly D, Quirion P. European emission trading
scheme and competitiveness: a case study on the
iron and steel industry. Energy Econ 2008,
30:2009–2027.
81. Martin R, Muûls M, de Preux DBL, Wagner UJ.
Industry compensation under relocation risk: a ﬁrm-
level analysis of the EU emissions trading scheme. Am
Econ Rev 2014, 104:2482–2508.
82. Marchiori C, Dietz S, Tavoni A. Domestic politics and
the formation of international environmental agree-
ments. J Environ Econ Manag 2016, 81:115–131.
83. Carbon Disclosure Project. Global Corporate Use of
Carbon Pricing: Disclosures to Investors. New York,
NY: Carbon Disclosure Project; 2014.
84. World Bank & Ecofys. State and Trends of Carbon
Pricing—2015. Washington, DC: The World
Bank; 2015.
85. EY. Shifting the Carbon Pricing Debate. London:
EYGM Limited; 2015.
86. Michaelowa A. Climate policy and interest
groups—a public choice analysis. Inter Econ 1998,
33:251–259.
87. Kirchgassner G, Schneider F. On the political econ-
omy of environmental policy. Public Choice 2003,
115:369–396.
88. Haines A, McMichael AJ, Smith KR, Roberts I,
Woodcock J, Markandya A, Armstrong BG,
Campbell-Lendrum D, Dangour AD, Davies M,
et al. Public health beneﬁts of strategies to reduce
greenhouse-gas emissions: overview and implications
for policy makers. Lancet 2009, 374:2104–2114.
89. Ürge-Vorsatz D, Herrero ST, Dubash NK,
Lecocq F. Measuring the co-beneﬁts of climate
change mitigation. Annu Rev Environ Resour
2014, 39:549–582.
90. Edenhofer O, Jakob M, Creutzig F, Flachsland C, Fuss
S, Kowarsch M, Lessmann K, Mattauch L, Siegmeier
J, Stecke JC. Closing the emission price gap. Glob
Environ Change 2015, 31:132–143.
91. Parry I, Veung C, Heine D. How much carbon pri-
cing is in countries’ own interests? the critical role of
co-beneﬁts. Clim Change Econ 2015, 06:1550019.
92. Longo A, Hoyos D, Markandya A. Willingness to
pay for ancillary beneﬁts of climate change mitiga-
tion. Environ Resour Econ 2012, 51:119–140.
93. Bain PG, Milfont TL, Kashima Y, Bilewicz M, Doron
G, Garðarsdóttir RB, Gouveia VV, Guan Y, Johansson
L-O, Pasquali C, et al. Co-beneﬁts of addressing cli-
mate change can motivate action around the world.
Nat Clim Change 2015, 6:154–157.
94. Nordhaus W. Climate clubs: overcoming free-riding
in international climate policy. Am Econ Rev 2015,
105:1339–1370.
95. van den Bergh JCJM. Rebound policy in the Paris
agreement: instrument comparison and climate-club
revenue offsets. Clim Policy 2016. In press.
96. MacKay DJC, Cramton P, Ockenfels A, Stoft S.
Price carbon—I will if you will. Nature 2015,
526:315–316.
97. Weitzman ML. Can negotiating a uniform carbon
price help to internalize the global warming exter-
nality? J Assoc Environ Resour Econ 2014,
1:29–49.
98. Frey BS. A constitution for knaves crowds out civic
virtues. Econ J 1997, 107:1043–1053.
99. Frey BS, Oberholzer-Gee F. The cost of price incen-
tives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding-
out. Am Econ Rev 1997, 87:746–755.
100. Gneezy U, Rustichini A. Pay enough or don’t pay at
all. Q J Econ 2000, 115:791–810.
101. Cardenas J-C, Stranlund JK, Willis C. Local environ-
mental control and institutional crowding-out. World
Dev 2000, 28:1719–1733.
102. Spash CL. The Brave New World of Carbon Trading.
Munich: University Library of Munich; 2009.
103. Rivers N, Schaufele B. Salience of carbon taxes in the
gasoline market. J Environ Econ Manag 2015,
74:23–36.
104. Bazin D, Ballet J, Touahri D. Environmental
responsibility versus taxation. Ecol Econ 2004,
49:129–134.
105. Bazin D, Ballet J, Touahri D. Psychological effect of
taxation and responsibility. a reply to Thomas
A. Okey and Bruce A. Wright. Ecol Econ 2005,
53:295–298.
106. Okey TA, Wright BA. Sufﬁcient fuel taxes would
enhance ecologies, economies, and communities. Ecol
Econ 2005, 53:1–4.
107. DellaVigna S, Pope D. Predicting Experimental
Results: Who Knows What? Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research; 2016.
108. Ellerman AD, Marcantonini C, Zaklan A. The
European union emissions trading system: ten years
and counting. Rev Environ Econ Policy 2016,
10:89–107.
109. Chichilnisky G, Heal G. Who should abate carbon
emissions? Econ Lett 1994, 44:443–449.
110. Aldy JE, Stavins RN. The promise and problems of
pricing carbon: theory and experience. J Environ Dev
2012, 21:152–180.
111. Schneider L, Kollmuss A. Perverse effects of car-
bon markets on HFC-23 and SF6 abatement pro-
jects in Russia. Nat Clim Change 2015,
5:10617–1063.
Advanced Review wires.wiley.com/climatechange
16 of 17 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Volume 8, July/August 2017
112. Carattini S, Tavoni A. How green are green econo-
mists? Econ Bull 2016, 36:2311–2323.
113. Baranzini A, Borzykowski N, Carattini S. Carbon
Offsets Out of the Woods? The Acceptability of
Domestic vs. International Reforestation Pro-
grammes. London: Grantham Research Institute on
Climate Change and the Environment; 2016.
114. Böhringer C, Lange A. On the design of optimal
grandfathering schemes for emission allowances. Eur
Econ Rev 2005, 49:2041–2055.
115. Cramton P, Kerr S. Tradeable carbon permit auc-
tions. Energy Policy 2002, 30:333–345.
116. Wood PJ, Jotzo F. Price ﬂoors for emissions trading.
Energy Policy 2011, 39:1746–1753.
117. OECD. Effective Carbon Rates—Pricing CO2
through Taxes and Emissions Trading Systems. Paris:
OECD Publishing; 2016.
118. van den Bergh JCJM, Botzen WJW. A lower bound
to the social cost of CO2 emissions. Nat Clim Change
2014, 4:253–258.
119. Howarth RB, Gerst MD, Borsuk ME. Risk mitigation
and the social cost of carbon. Glob Environ Change
2014, 24:123–131.
WIREs Climate Change Carbon pricing in climate policy
Volume 8, Ju ly /August 2017 © 2017 The Authors. WIREs Climate Change published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 17 of 17
